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I, Statement of Jurisdictipn 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (1995) , Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). The 
trial court signed the final written order of dismissal on July 
22, 1997. R.31. 
II. Statement of the Issue(s) Presented for Review & Standard of 
Appellate Review 
Issue (s) for Review. (A) Did the trial court fail to 
evaluate the significance of uncontroverted facts, or facts as 
the court found them? (B) Are the trial court's conclusions of 
law based on such facts correct? Was the trial court's 
conclusion induced by an erroneous view of the law? Does State 
v. White, 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah 1993) authorize the trial court to 
grant a motion to suppress under the facts presented by this 
present case? 
Standard of Review. (A) Factual findings underlying trial 
courts' decisions to grant motions to suppress are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard". State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d 1182 
(Utah 1995) . A reviewing court "will find clear error only if 
[it decides] that the factual findings made by the trial court 
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are not adequately supported by the record." Id. Facts are 
considered uin a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." Id. (B) An appellate court then "reviews the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a 
correctness standard, [citation omitted] , according no deference 
to its legal conclusions." Id. 
III. Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, 
Ordinances, and Rules 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
1. Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
2. Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
B. Statutes 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-16 (1953 as amended): 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. S 77-18a-l(2) (1995) \"Appeals-When proper."!: 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: (a) a 
final order of dismissal . . . . 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) [Court of Appeals 
jurig^igtiQnrl . 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, over: 
• * • * 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases . . . . 
C. Ordinances - Salt Lake City Corporation 
1. 11.2 0.040. Unlawful acts involving drug paraphernalia. 
A. It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, 
grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. 
B. It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with 
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any 
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be 
used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or 
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in 
violation of this chapter. 
C. It is unlawful for any person eighteen years of age or 
over to deliver drug paraphernalia to a minor. 
D. It is unlawful for any person to place in this city, in 
any newspaper, magazine, handbill or other publication, any 
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is 
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. (Prior code § 32-8A-4) 
2. 11.24.020. Controlled substances - Possession prohibited -
ExceptJQngt 
A. No person shall knowingly or intentionally possess or use 
a controlled substance, as defined in the Controlled Substances 
Act of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, or its successor, unless it 
is obtained pursuant to a valid prescription or order, or 
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directly from a practitioner authorized to prescribe such 
substances, while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the Controlled 
Substances Act. 
B. Violation of this section shall be punished with a 
punishment provided for a Class B misdemeanor. (Prior code § 32-
8-5) 
1^ ;U,48,Q7Q. Congealed weapons?
 T 
A. It is unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, to 
carry any slingshot, brass knuckles, firearms, daggers, stiletto, 
nunchaku stick, or any other instrument or object capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury concealed upon his person. 
B. It is unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, to 
carry concealed on his person any dangerous weapon with the 
intent or the purpose to use the same to harm, maim or injure 
another person, animal or thing. For the purpose of this 
subsection: 
1. "Dangerous weapon" means any item that, in the manner of 
its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury; and 
2. In construing whether or not an object or thing not 
commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the 
character of the wound produced, if any, and the manner in which 
the instrument, object or thing was used or intended to be used, 
are factors which the court shall take into account in deciding 
the question. (Prior code § 32-6-3) 
P. Rules. 
1. Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final order of dismissal . . . . 
IV, Statement of the Case 
The Defendant, Arnold L. Medina ("Defendant"), is alleged to 
have committed violations of Salt Lake City Code Sections 
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11.24.020 (Possession of a Controlled Substance), 11.20.040 (Drug 
Paraphernalia), and 11.48.070 (Carrying a Concealed Weapon). R.5. 
The Defendant entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment to the 
charges on/about January 16, 1997. A pretrial conference was 
held on March 19, 1997. See Record ("R."), Index of Proceedings. 
On or about April 16, 1997, the Defendant, through counsel, 
filed his "Motion to Suppress Based on No Reasonable Suspicion to 
Frisk", citing the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Grovier, 
808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1591); State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985); and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). 
R.4. On or about April 17, 1997, an evidentiary hearing was held 
on the Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court took the 
defendant's motion under advisement. See Record, Index of 
Proceedings. On or about April 22, the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("FFCL"). R.27-30. 
The trial court, relying primarily on State v. White, found 
that "although the stop was justified, the frisk was not 
justified." R.29. The trial court ordered all search evidence 
suppressed. R.29. A trial date was set. On July 9, 1997, the 
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City indicated that the court's order suppressing the frisk 
evidence effectively prevented the City from going forward with 
the prosecution, and requested the court's certification to that 
effect pursuant to State v. Troyer. 866 P. 2d 528 (Utah 1993) . 
The trial court ordered the case dismissed. The certification 
and order of dismissal were signed by Judge Hilder on July 23, 
1997. R.31. This appeal followed. The Notice of Appeal was 
filed August 6, 1997. R.33. 
V, Statement of Relevant Facts, 
Facts as found by the trial court are set out in bold and 
quotation marks. The record evidence dealing with the same 
subject matter follows. 
A. "On December 22, 1996, Officer Wooldridge was 
patrolling in the area of 915 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City." R.27. 
The officer had worked as a Salt Lake City Police Officer 
for at least five (5) years at the date of this encounter. R.40. 
The officer had worked in the immediate area for "about 8 months 
as a patrol officer on graveyards" at some point prior to this 
encounter. R.40. The officer "was doing an overtime shift for 
DUI suppression" and indicated that provided him "the opportunity 
on duty to check up on a problem area within [his] district." 
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R.44. 
B. "Officer Wooldridge proceeded down an alley, which 
alley is notorious for criminal activity, at which time he 
observed two males apparently attempting to enter the motor 
vehicle without the use of a key." R.27. 
The officer identified specific criminal problems in the 
area, among them "drug sales" and "numerous stabbings, shootings 
and fights". R.43-44. The officer indicated that the alley is 
not well lighted, describing it as "very dark". R.45. The 
officer was in uniform, in an unmarked police car, running 
without headlights or brakelights ("blacked out"). R.45-46. The 
officer observed two persons near a parked car in the alley. 
R.46. The area where the vehicle was located was not generally a 
parking area, and was located near the Red Belle Saloon. R.46. 
"The trunk of the car was facing northbound and the trunk of the 
car was pretty much just to north of the back door of the Red 
Belle . . . ." R.52. 
The defendant was trying to get into the car on the 
passenger side, "which would have been on the side on the alley." 
R.52. The officer observed the two persons for "mere seconds" 
before approaching them. R.53. The officer "approached [the 
defendant] because things looked suspicious because he [looked] 
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like [he was] breaking into a car". R.61. Initially, the officer 
observed the defendant trying to get in to the parked car "with 
what appeared to be some type of tools". R.46. These tools 
turned out to be "a coat hanger and a screwdriver". R.46. 
C. "Officer Wooldridge called for back-up, but he 
proceeded to approach the two individuals alone." R.28. 
No one else was seen in the alley by the officer. R.46. The 
officer "probably" called for backup assistance "prior to 
approaching" the defendant. R.54. The officer did not recognize 
the defendant until he approached the defendant on foot, before 
he frisked the defendant. R.54. The basis for approaching the 
defendant was that "it appeared that he was breaking into a car" 
and the area was one with "continued and frequent drug activity, 
homicide stabbings, shootings . . . ." R.60. 
Immediately upon approaching him, the defendant advised the 
officer that this was the defendant's own car. R.61-62. When he 
approached the two persons, the officer gave a verbal command for 
them to put their hands on the back of their heads or to keep 
their hands where the officer could see them. R.63. Both persons 
complied. R.63. 
The officer indicated that there are a number of things that 
could be "keyed on" under the circumstances, among them: someone 
8 
trying to put their hands in their pockets after being told not 
to do so, and the presence of tools already in someone's hands. 
R.64. "The fact that [the defendant] already had two instruments 
in his hand[s] and tools indicated to [the officer] that [the 
defendant] might have other tools, or objects . . . that he could 
have used as a weapon on his person." R.64. The officer could 
not recall where the tools were when the officer directed the 
persons to raise their hands, but indicated that he did not see 
the defendant "drop his tools and try to go for anything else." 
R.64. At some point prior to the frisk, the officer collected 
the tools from the defendant. R.64. 
D. wAs Officer Wooldridge approached the individuals/ he 
not one of them was defendant, Arnold Medina, Mr, Medina 
was known Officer Wooldridge as an employee of an 
establishment located in the immediate area where he was observed 
by the officer." R.28. 
The officer was "familiar with [the defendant] because [the 
officer] knew that [the defendant] worked at the Red Belle 
Saloon." R.61-62. The officer estimated he had had between four 
and seven prior conversations with the defendant, and "most 
times" the defendant appeared to be "very amicable and willing to 
cooperate" with the officer. R.55. At other times, the defendant 
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was "'just verbally disagreeable"', and very physically animated" 
when he talked. R.55. The defendant "had never tried to strike 
[the officer] or do anything physical towards [him]" other than 
being physically animated as he spoke. R.55 (quoting defense 
counsel). 
The officer indicated he believed the defendant had the 
"potential for violence based on his history." R.56. The officer 
was not "personally aware" of the defendant "having a reputation 
for carrying a gun". R.56. The officer testified that "No one 
has ever told me that [the defendant] had carried a weapon." 
R.57. The officer testified that "[the officer] did suspect in 
the past that [the defendant] may have [carried a weapon]." R.57. 
As a basis for that suspicion, the officer indicated that the 
defendant's demeanor in the Red Belle Saloon, the Saloon's 
reported affiliation with a motorcycle gang, that motorcycle 
gang's "potential for violence" and "affiliation" with a 
methamphetamine lab, and the officer's encounters with "people 
who had been in and out of the Red Belle who had been carrying 
meth on them." R.57. As to the defendant, the officer had "no 
other valid information, other than the fact that [the defendant] 
work[ed] there, that [he was] involved in any of [the] illegal 
activity that [the officer] referred to . . . ." R.58 (quoting 
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defense counsel's questioning). The officer's suspicion about 
the defendant was based on the location at which he worked and 
the officer's previous 4-7 ''primarily amiable" contacts with the 
defendant. R.59 (quoting defense counsel's questioning). Any 
prior disagreements between the officer and the defendant were 
only marked by the defendant's being "very animated physically 
and . . . verbally loud." R.59 (defense counsel's 
characterizations). During prior conversations, the officer and 
the defendant had discussed the defendant's criminal history, and 
had discussed the defendant's "problems with people in the bar". 
R.59. The officer did not suspect the defendant as a suspect in 
x
'any homicides or shootings that had occurred just prior" to the 
officer approaching the defendant in the alley. R.60-61 (quoting 
defense counsel) . The officer did not go "back into that alley 
based on looking for some suspect for a homicide or a shooting". 
R.61 (quoting defense counsel). The officer's entry into the 
alley "was part of proactive patrolling and trying to prevent 
something from happening". R.61. The officer was not 
"investigating some just prior incident that occurred that 
evening". R.61 (quoting defense counsel). The officer was "just 
doing general surveillance of the area to make sure nothing [did] 
happen". R.61 (quoting defense counsel). 
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E. "In addition, as Officer Wooldridge approached the two 
individuals/ he noted that Mr. Medina was holding both a coat 
hanger and a screw driver. Officer Wooldridge did not notice any 
other tools or implements of any kind/ neither did he notice any 
suspicious bulges or items in defendant's clothing." R.28. 
The officer could see both of the defendant's hands, and 
could identify what the tools were that he had in his hands. 
R.49. The officer then patted down the defendant for weapons. 
R.49. In the course of the search, the officer felt a knifelike 
object in the defendant's right front pants pocket, and in the 
left front pants pocket an object that felt like paraphernalia. 
R.50. The knife was a folding knife, roughly three to four 
inches long in the pocket, had two blades, with the words "jack 
the ripper" on it. R.50,65. The officer indicated that the 
defendant reported the car was his, that he had locked his keys 
in the vehicle, and was trying to get back into the car. R.50. 
At the time the officer frisked the defendant, the officer did 
not know that it was in fact the defendant's car. R.51. 
F. "Officer Wooldridge had had numerous conversations with 
defendant, knew that he was an employee of the adjacent 
establishment/ and although he knew of a criminal record/ Officer 
Wooldridge did not specifically identify any history of violence 
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during his testimony." R.28. 
G. "Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had some 
concern because he did not know the other individual in the 
alley, the officer frisked Mr. Medina, the person that was known 
to him, I i i nt ; therefore Court iiindH I: licit; Officer Wooldridge 
did not objectively evidence any heightened concern about the 
unknown person." R.28. 
The officer described the other person as "another older 
gentleman". R.45. The officer indicated that "because of the 
location, [and] the return criminal problems there, [the 
officer's] previous contacts with [the defendant], the officer 
did a (inaudible) frisk for [his] safety." R.47. The officer 
also "patted down" the other individual, checked both persons for 
warrants, and "sent the other gentleman on his way." R.51. 
The officer had had "several other contacts that ended in 
arrests in that alley" a few months before. The homicide 
sergeant had called the alley "murder alley". R.53. Before 
determining whether the car was in fact the defendant's, "because 
of contacts [the police] have had with individuals in that area 
[the officer] was going to check [the defendant] for weapons for 
[the officer's] safety." R.62. "[At] that point in time, [the 
officer did not] do anything to try to verify that this was in 
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fact [the defendant's] car." R.62. 
* [The] very next thing [the officer] did was in fact, frisk 
[the defendant]." R.62. While the officer was frisking the 
defendant, the "other gentleman" was outside the officer's 
eyesight, possibly off to the officer's left. This "other 
gentleman" was not moving, "keeping his hands either on his head 
or in plain view." R.62. 
The officer checked the defendant for weapons " [b]ecause 
it's a dark alley, there's frequent physical assaults in that 
area. I'm alone, I have two people with me . . . [the defendant 
and the] other gentleman that I didn't know and I didn't know his 
history . . . ." R.66. The officer stated that "I believe that 
any other action than to check these people for weapons would 
detriment [sic] to physical safety." R.66-67. 
The officer answered affirmatively when asked whether in the 
course of "investigating people just generally on the street in 
[his] course of duty as a police officer [he had] found that some 
people have weapons and would in fact attack [him] as a police 
officer''. R.67. 
VI. Summary of the Argument, 
Irrespective of the trial court's factual interpretation of 
the testimony, the trial court erroneously interpreted or applied 
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State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court's 
order that the evidence be suppressed should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the trial court for trial. 
VII. ARGUMENT. 
The "frisk" in Utah is governed by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-7-16 (1953 as amended) : UA peace officer who has 
stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person 
for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger." 
The trial court's interpretation or application of State v. 
White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), and associated state and 
federal case law to the facts presented here is incorrect. 
1Whether reasonable suspicion exists in investigative 
detentions may present a question of fact." White, 856 P. 2d at 
659. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress, [the appellate court] will uphold the trial 
court's underlying findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous." White, 856 P.2d at 659. 
The final determination of lawfulness of a detention or 
search is reviewed for correctness. White, 856 P. 2d at 659 
(citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-71(Utah 1993)). 
15 
Here, the trial court "failed to evaluate the significance 
of uncontroverted facts, or facts as the court found them"; 
therefore the trial court's conclusion was xw induced by an 
erroneous view of the law'". White, 856 P.2d at 659(quoting State 
v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)(citations omitted)). 
A. Reliability of the Information (Direct Officer Observation) 
Was Not At Issue 
w[T]he reliability of the information upon which a 
particular frisk is based becomes a critical element [of the 
appellate court's] evaluation of that frisk." White. 856 P.2d at 
661. A significant factual distinction between White and the 
present case is that reliability of information from a third 
party is not at issue. The officer's suspicion of criminal 
activity here did not arise from a third-party phone call, but 
from personal observation. Here an officer observed an 
individual attempting to enter a car with a coat hanger and a 
screw driver in a dark alley. In White, the officer personally 
observed two figures in the back seat of a car engaged in some 
undetermined activity. Thus, a major concern of the White court 
is not present here, specifically that "the trial court made no 
finding about the reliability of the information given to the 
officers." White. 856 P.2d at 662. 
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The White opinion reads: 
In this case, the questionable reliability of [the 
informant's] allegations should have sensitized both 
the officers and the trial court to the need for 
considering whether the frisk could be justified 
independently of the stop. Circumstantial information 
which might dispel or support initial concern that a 
frisk might be necessary, therefore, becomes 
particularly relevant. 
White, 856 P. 2d at 662 (emphasis added) . The circumstantial 
information available to the officer here increased concern for 
safety, not dissipated it, and justified the frisk. 
B. No Preliminary Inquiry Was Required Prior to Frisk, 
When is an automatic frisk justified and no preliminary 
inquiry necessary? Stated otherwise, what is reasonable inquiry 
under any given fact pattern? How much preliminary inquiry is 
enough? 
The City specifically takes issue with two of the trial 
court's conclusions of law. First: 
2. The officer appropriately identified himself as a 
policeman, but before he made reasonable inquiries 
he engaged in a Terry frisk of Mr. Medina." R.28. 
Under the facts here, no inquiry was required prior to the 
frisk. The record indicates that the defendant volunteered 
information when confronted that the car was his. In some 
situations, that would be enough to suggest some additional 
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reasonable preliminary inquiry would be appropriate. For 
example, two officers coming across a person in a busy parking 
lot at noon trying to get in a car with just a coat hanger. No 
potential weapons are in hand, one officer can observe the 
citizen, the other officer can help the citizen gain entry to the 
car and proof of ownership, call a locksmith, or call dispatch 
for registration information. 
The expectation of the trial court appears to be that a solo 
officer in a dark alley, outnumbered two to one, is expected to 
confirm that the vehicle is in fact the defendant's. There are 
problems with this expectation. Assuming that the registration 
is in the car, it is now locked in the car. Is the officer 
obligated to unlock the car and examine the registration while 
two persons hover about him? This means that the officer must 
attempt the trial court's investigation and monitor two persons 
who could be armed. 
The officer could detain the two persons until back-up 
arrives - an uncertain proposition at best. Such a scenario 
leaves the suspect (s) and the officer in a state of dynamic 
tension for an unknown period of time. If the suspects are 
innocent citizens, they must wait until resource demands allow 
back-up to arrive. If the suspects are armed, and they know they 
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cannot be searched until backup arrives, they will know that 
their best opportunity for escape is to overwhelm or evade the 
lone officer before backup arrives. Such a policy determination 
invites attack on a solitary officer waiting for backup. 
C. Reasonable Suspicion for a Frisk Did Not Dissipate Between the 
Investigative Detention and the Frisk Itself. 
Dissipative Factors. What causes "reasonable suspicion to 
frisk" to "dissipate"? "If by investigation or happenstance the 
quantum of evidence needed to justify a forcible stop has 
dissipated during [the interval between the stop and the frisk], 
then it is not permissible to frisk." Wayne R. LeFave, 3 Search 
^ d Seizure, § 9.4(a) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987) (quoted in White. 856 
P.2d at 663) . 
The trial court attached an improper significance to the 
officer's prior contacts with the defendant that is not supported 
by the evidence: 
4. Based on the Officer's testimony, and on his fairly 
significant acquaintenship [sic] with Defendant, as well as 
the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by 
his employment, which fact was known to the officer, the 
Court determines that a reasonable officer's fears would 
have been appropriately dispelled and that the need for a 
frisk dissipated before the frisk was undertaken. 
R.29.(emphasis added). 
The general statement that a conclusion of law is based on 
an officer's testimony is not helpful. The characterization of 
19 
the officer-defendant acquaintance as "fairly significant" is 
based on 4-7 prior conversations, some of which involved 
discussion of the defendant's prior criminal history. R.55. The 
trial court is mandating that a prior acquaintanceship without 
confirmation of violence or a violent nature can override the 
significance of the context of the immediate encounter. This 
presents the dreaded "slippery slope". 
What parameters define a fairly significant acquaintance 
that renders a frisk unreasonable? How much knowledge of 
personal background "dissipates" appropriate concern for safety? 
What knowledge of the defendant's personal background here 
dissipated reasonable concern and rendered the frisk 
inappropriate? The City would submit that the context of the 
encounter here should be given greater weight in the balancing 
test than prior acquaintance. 
The one specific point referred to by the trial court is 
"the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by his 
employment". R.29. Common knowledge confirms that crimes are 
committed at businesses by employees either during their shift or 
after work hours. The nature of the business itself can provide 
an employee with the opportunity for certain criminal activity. 
Common sense would acknowledge that employees can commit crimes 
20 
against other employees as they work or against customers who 
might be fully enjoying the service provided by the 
establi shment ? 
The officer's recognition of and acquaintance with the 
defendant does not dissipate the reasonable suspicion for a frisk 
here. This was not a lifelong friend trying to get into the car 
that the officer had seen him driving everyday for twenty years 
down main street at noon. The assertion by the defendant that the 
car was his property does not by itself dissipate the concern for 
safety. Perhaps if the defendant could have produced title or 
registration - but then, those were either unavailable or locked 
in the car. Police officers should not be and are not required 
by law to conduct preliminary investigation or inquiry before the 
officers have taken reasonable precautions for their safety. 
The significance of the third-party informant to White's 
analysis regarding the need for preliminary inquiry is apparent. 
"Where a confrontation develops in such a manner that 
questioning can be safely undertaken to substantiate or dispel 
suspicions originally aroused by third party hearsay rather than 
actual observation, preliminary inquiry may be especially 
appropriate." White, 856 P.2d at 663 (emphasis added). This 
suggests a frisk based on actual observation of suspected 
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criminal activity, as here, reduces the need for preliminary 
inquiry. 
D. The Type of Criminal Activity Suspected Here Supports the 
Legality of the Frisk, 
Terry, subsequent comment and Utah case law recognize that 
the type of criminal activity suspected can be determinative of 
frisk legality. White dealt primarily with the contexts of 
police response to domestic violence related calls and suspicion 
of cocaine use. White. 856 P. 2d at 664. White acknowledged 
differences among types of suspected crime in relation to an 
"automatic frisk": 
The concurrence in Terry first noted that 
experience generally showed that the suspicion of 
certain types of criminal activity suggested an 
increased likelihood that the suspect might be armed 
and dangerous. According to Justice Harlan, where 
there is uan articulable suspicion of a crime of 
violence," and an officer makes a justified stop, the 
potential that the suspect is dangerous is so great 
that "the right to frisk must be immediate and 
automatic." 
White. 856 P. 2d at 663 (footnotes omitted) . The type of 
suspected criminal activity here further distinguishes this case 
from the result in White: 
Utah courts have also noted the significance of the 
nature of suspected crime on the right to conduct an 
immediate frisk of a suspect. See State v. Carter. 707 
P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1985); State v. Stricklina. 844 
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1992) . Specifically the 
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Carter court authorized the automatic frisk of a 
burglary suspect because the officer could reasonably 
believe that a burglar might carry dangerous tools or 
weapons in anticipation of strenuous objection from an 
intended victim. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660. 
White. 856 P.2d at 663 n.8 (emphasis added). A screwdriver is 
capable of being considered a dangerous tool or weapon in and of 
itself. 
White also shows that the distinction between types of 
suspected criminal activity has been recognized in the leading 
treatise: 
Commentary has [since Terry] suggested that the 
right to frisk should be automatic whenever "the 
suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that he has 
committed, was committing or was about to commit a type 
of crime for which the offender would likely be armed, 
whether the weapon would be used to actually commit the 
crime, to escape if the scheme went awry, or for 
protection against the victim or others involved." 
Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure. § 9.4(a) at 506 
(2nd ed. 1987) . 
White. 856 P. 2d at 665 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) . The 
trial court's only reference in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to the type of suspected criminal activity is 
that the officer "observed two males apparently attempting to 
enter a motor vehicle without use of a key." R.27. The trial 
court did not consider the nature of the suspected criminal 
activity in its analysis. 
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E. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Support the Legality of 
the Frisk 
The trial court indicated that it relied primarily on State 
v. White. R.29. Although White is distinguishable in its facts, 
the analysis it provides is crucial. u[T]he totality of 
circumstances determines reasonableness in a Fourth Amendment 
inquiry . . . ." White, 856 P.2d at 661. 
The record here does not specify what type of specific 
challenge the officer issued to the two people in the alley. 
However, the trial court concluded in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that the officer appropriately identified 
himself as a policeman. R.28. The trial court also concluded 
that "before [the officer] made reasonable inquiries he engaged 
in a Terry frisk of [the defendant]." R.28. The "reasonable 
inquiry" mandates of the Terry frisk doctrine were reasonably 
foregone under the circumstances, and indeed such inquiry is not 
required under the White analysis. "Since [Terry], the Supreme 
Court has indicated an officer may forego this initial inquiry 
when, because of specific circumstances, questioning would be 
dangerous to the police officer." White, 856 P.2d at 662 
(citation omitted). Specific circumstances here indicated that 
further questioning could be dangerous to the police officer. 
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In White, the Court of Appeals agreed that "the officers, 
anticipating a volatile situation, reasonably took precautions 
preparing for their encounter with defendant." White. 856 P.2d at 
662. In White, the primary officer "requested three back up 
officers to accompany him when he responded to [the informant's] 
call." Two detectives confirmed certain facts when the officers 
arrived. Two marked police cars and one unmarked police car 
drove up behind the suspect vehicle in White. The suspect 
vehicle was in a club parking lot. White, 856 P.2d at 657. 
The present situation is distinct from the White fact 
pattern. Here a lone officer in a dark alley observes two men, 
one with tools in hand, attempt to enter a vehicle without a key 
in an area notorious for criminal activity and one with which the 
officer is familiar on a personal basis. The fact pattern here 
is much closer to Terry than White. See White. 856 P.2d at 660 
n. 6. 
In White the defendant claimed that: 
his cooperative behavior should immediately have 
diffused any imminent sense of danger. Once that sense 
of danger reasonably dissipated, he argues that minimal 
inquiry would have dispelled any lingering suspicions 
about the possibility of criminal activity or danger to 
the investigating officers. 
White. 856 P. 2d at 662. Cooperative behavior is one 
25 
consideration under the totality of the circumstances, but is not 
determinative by itself. 
White discussed a number of determinative criteria: time of 
the encounter [day versus night as opposed to length], number of 
officers and number of suspects, prior information indicating 
that defendant was armed, and the defendant's behavior. White. 
856 P. 2d at 662-663. The totality of the circumstances must be 
examined to determine whether the circumstances create "an 
environment in which the responding officers could further 
question defendant [before frisking him] without fear for their 
safety." White. 856 P. 2d at 663. The White analysis considers 
other fact-specific information as well. 
Multi-factor analysis of criminal activity and danger. The 
White "Multi-factor Analysis of Criminal Activity and Danger" 
mandates that the totality of the circumstances controls: 
Individually, none of the evaluative criteria 
described above are determinative of an officer's 
prospective decision on the necessity of a frisk, and 
no one factor controls a reviewing court's 
retrospective evaluation of whether a frisk was 
justified at its inception. Instead, the police action 
must be a reasonable invasion of an individual's 
personal security in light of all circumstances of the 
particular encounter. 
White. 856 P.2d at 665(emphasis added). 
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The White decision identified "three Utah cases which have 
applied multi-factor analysis to justify frisks." White, 856 P.2d 
at 665 n.13. This case is generally distinguishable from those, 
but falls closest to State v. Carter, 707 P. 2d 656 (Utah 
1985)("allowing solo officer to frisk burglary suspect with 
suspicious bulge in pocket when officer confronted suspect in 
dark alley near burglary scene"). White, 856 P.2d at 665 n.13. 
In the cases listed by the White decision a bulge in a pocket or 
some other suggestion that there was a concealed weapon was 
present. The record here does not present a suspicious bulge in 
a pocket or coat visible from a distance. 
At night, in a poorly lit alley, the ability to discern such 
a bulge is diminished. The "suspicious bulge" criteria is better 
suited to daylight or well-lit area searches. Here the record 
presents a potential suspect possibly caught in the act of 
burglarizing a car at night in an alley with poor lighting. 
Further, the potential suspect has a tool in hand that can 
constitute a dangerous weapon. That suggested to the officer 
based on his experience that the individual before him might be 
carrying other potential weapons. White does not require that a 
"suspicious bulge" be present at night before a frisk is 
undertaken. 
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In White, "the allegations of criminal activity were 
provided by unverified third party hearsay." White. 856 P.2d at 
666. Here the suspected criminal activity was observed first 
hand. The officer's concern for potential violence in White 
arose from alleged domestic violence that had occurred some time 
prior to the officer-citizen encounter. 
The White officer(s) "approached defendant under relatively 
safe conditions, during midday, in a parking lot, and in the 
company of three other officers." White. 856 P. 2d at 666. Here 
one officer approached two persons under potentially hazardous 
conditions, at night, in a dark alley with a reputation for 
criminal activity. "On-scene observations [in White! . . . did 
not indicate present or intended criminal activity." White. 856 
P.2d at 666. Direct on-scene observations by the officer here 
suggested immediate criminal activity. Under all the 
circumstances, where at least one of the two persons had a 
potential weapon in hand, the officer is not required to make 
inquiries before moving to frisk the suspects. Especially where 
the officer is alone and outnumbered, to engage in that type of 
inquiry places him at unnecessary risk. 
The trial court stated its concern thus: 
Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had 
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some concern because he did not know the other 
individual in the alley, the officer frisked Mr. 
Medina, the person known to him first; therefore the 
Court finds that Officer Wooldridge did not objectively 
evidence any heightened concern about the unknown 
person." 
R.28. Why is it significant to the trial court that the officer 
was not specific in his concerns about the unknown person? Under 
the circumstances, the fact that the unknown person was 
accompanying the person attempting to gain entry into the car is 
simply one more circumstance that increases the officer's concern 
for his safety. 
That the officer searched the defendant first, even though 
he was known to the officer, is only appropriate. The trial 
court's notation suggests that searching the known individual 
first somehow demonstrates a lack of concern about the other 
gentleman, and somehow provides support for the trial court's 
theory that the reasonable concern dissipated before the frisk. 
The City disputes such an interpretation. The known individual 
was also the only one with a potential weapon in hand. That 
suggests that he may be more likely to have other tools (or 
weapons) on his person. That in fact turned out to be the case. 
The "other gentleman" was frisked and sent on his way. The 
known individual was searched and in fact a potential dangerous 
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weapon was found on his person. 
In addition, why is the amount of detail regarding the 
"other gentleman" determinative of the frisk of the person 
actually trying to get into the car with the dangerous tool in 
hand? The officer had to choose someone to frisk first, if in 
fact he was going to frisk anyone. It is certainly reasonable to 
frisk the person actually trying to get into the car first. It 
would appear that just by the fact he is more active of the two 
persons that he is a greater potential threat. 
The City would submit that contrary to the trial court's 
determination, the officer here did in fact objectify his concern 
regarding "the other gentleman". As previously indicated the 
officer checked the defendant for weapons "[because] it's a dark 
alley, there's frequent physical assaults in that area. I'm 
alone, I have two people with me . . . [the defendant and the] 
other gentleman that I didn't know and I didn't know [the other 
gentleman's] history . . . ." R.66. The officer stated that "I 
believe that any other action than to check these people for 
weapons would detriment [sic] to physical safety." R.67. Simply 
put, "the other gentleman" was an additional unknown element in a 
situation already full of unknowns. 
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P. The Trial Court's Conclusion of Reasonableness Was "Induced by 
an Erroneous View of the Law", 
Regarding the '"reasonableness" determination, the White 
court states that it is a balancing test: "The Terry Court 
generally found xwno ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails.'" White. 856 P.2d at 665. The defense 
appeared to suggest that the officer was or should have been 
obligated to wait for backup, and/or make initial inquiries and 
then verify the response prior to the frisk. Holding a citizen 
while waiting for back up constitutes an 
invasion/imposition/intrusion/burden itself, one that both 
inconveniences an innocent citizen and that places an officer at 
risk if the citizen is inclined to harm the officer in order to 
escape before back-up arrives. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The trial court failed to evaluate the significance of 
uncontroverted facts, or facts as the court found them. The 
trial court's conclusions of law based on the facts are 
incorrect. The trial court's conclusions were induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. State v. White. 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah 
1993) , and related case law, does not authorize the trial court 
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to grant a motion to suppress under the facts presented by this 
case. 
The concern for officer safety was expressly acknowledged in 
White: "Utah courts recognize officers' need to protect 
themselves and others when they 'knowingly and willingly enter 
hostile environs to confront dangerous persons.' State v. Roybal. 
716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986)." White, 856 P.2d at 665. The 
facts here clearly qualify this as just such a "hostile environ". 
It is easy forget what reasonable fear is. For those of us 
whose contact with citizens is filtered past security personnel 
and metal detectors during the day the definition of reasonable 
fear may be one thing. For someone alone at night in a dark 
alley outnumbered by persons whose intent is unknown, reasonable 
fear may have a different definition. As a matter of social 
policy, the appropriate mandates of frisk law do not prevent a 
police officer from doing a weapons/safety frisk before 
conducting a preliminary inquiry under these facts. 
The trial court either misinterpreted or misapplied the 
dictates of State v. White. Terry v. Ohio, and associated case 
law. Therefore the trial court's conclusions of law and order 
suppressing evidence based on such facts are incorrect. 
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On that basis, the City would request that the Court's order 
suppressing the frisk evidence be overruled and the matter 
remanded to the District Court for trial. 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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